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In the Shadows of Sunlight:
The Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns
Abby K. Wood and Douglas M. Spencer

ABSTRACT
In recent years, the courts have invalidated a variety of campaign finance laws while simultaneously upholding disclosure requirements. Courts view disclosure as a less-restrictive means to root out corruption
while critics claim that disclosure chills speech and deters political participation. Using individual-level
contribution data from state elections between 2000 and 2008, we find that the speech-chilling effects
of disclosure are negligible. On average, less than one donor per candidate is likely to stop contributing
when the public visibility of campaign contributions increases. Moreover, we do not observe heterogeneous
effects for small donors or ideological outliers despite an assumption in First Amendment jurisprudence
that these donors are disproportionately affected by campaign finance regulations. In short, the argument
that disclosure chills speech is not strongly supported by the data.
Keywords: campaign finance, disclosure, transparency, state politics, First Amendment
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A

s a result of the wave of anticorruption reforms in the 1970s and technological advancements in the 2000s, governments in the United
States make many proceedings, decisions, and information easily accessible to anyone who is interested. As government transparency has increased,
mandatory disclosure has also increased (BenShahar and Schneider 2014). Political campaigns
are no exception. States and the federal government
mandate that candidates disclose both personal
financial information and the sources of their
campaign finances (Briffault 2010; Corrado 1997).
The purpose of these disclosure laws is to provide
the electorate with information about electionrelated spending sources and to prevent or expose
political corruption. Although the courts have
grown skeptical of limiting the sources of campaign
funds in recent years, judges almost always uphold
disclosure requirements despite challenges that
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under the terms of the Creative Commons License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted
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transparency chills speech and deters political
participation.
In Buckley v. Valeo the Supreme Court held
that disclosure ‘‘appear[s] to be the least restrictive
means of curbing the evils of campaign ignorance
and corruption.’’1 In McConnell v. FEC three justices
who disagreed with the Court’s opinion on certain
regulations of soft money nonetheless voted to uphold
disclosure and disclaimer requirements.2 In Citizens
United 3 the Court invalidated a federal ban on independent expenditures from a corporation’s general
treasury by a 5–4 vote yet agreed 8–1 that disclosure
requirements for entities who fund independent electioneering communication are constitutionally valid
under the First Amendment.4 Even more recently,
lower courts have upheld various disclosure laws
and practices in state and federal elections, e.g., The
Real Truth About Abortion v. FEC,5 Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan,6 Free Speech v. FEC,7
Center for Individual Freedom v. Tennant,8 Protect
Marriage.com-Yes on 8 v. Bowen,9 Committee for
Justice and Fairness v. Arizona,10 Justice v. Hoseman,11 Delaware Strong Families v. Denn,12 Van
Hollen v. FEC.13 This repeated endorsement of disclosure by the courts has prompted interest groups,
commissions, academics, and legislators to respond
to the deregulation of federal campaign finance
rules with calls for stricter disclosure laws (see, e.g.,
Hasen 2012; Briffault 2012b; Cain 2010; Briffault
2010).14
Despite a willingness to uphold disclosure laws as
‘‘a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive
regulations of speech,’’15 the Supreme Court has consistently expressed a serious concern about laws that
have the effect of chilling speech, particularly political speech. In the Court’s view, disclosure generally
does not chill speech in a way that violates the
First Amendment. As long as disclosure has a ‘‘substantial relation’’ to a ‘‘sufficiently important government interest’’ it does not abridge the freedom of
speech.16 Nevertheless, some argue that disclosure
can chill political speech (McGeveran 2003; Gilbert
2012, 2013), and others believe it does (Samples
2010; Wang 2013). Conservative groups have
objected to enhanced campaign finance disclosure
by arguing that it increases the risk of harassment
against those who donate to controversial candidates
or causes (e.g., Messner 2009). Historically, the
Supreme Court has been sympathetic to demonstrated claims of harassment, or fear of harassment,
by donors to controversial candidates and causes.
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Where disclosure of contributions will subject contributors to the ‘‘reasonable probability’’ of ‘‘threats,
harassment, or reprisals,’’ the First Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosures.17
As a general matter, courts have held that the benefits of transparency outweigh any alleged costs,
though data quantifying the costs and benefits of
disclosure have emerged more slowly than court
opinions upholding disclosure (Levinson 2016).
Moreover, there is no guarantee that courts will continue to uphold disclosure regulations (Shaw 2016).
In this article, we use individual-level contribution
data to quantify the impact of disclosure on political
participation. We analyze elections at the state level

1

424 U.S. 1 at 68 (1976).
540 U.S. 93 at 321 (2003).
3
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
4
As in McConnell, only Justice Thomas dissented on the point
of disclosure, arguing that the First Amendment protects anonymous free speech and that disclosure might lead to retaliation
by one’s political nemeses.
5
681 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2012).
6
697 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2012).
7
720 F.3d 788 (10th Cir. 2013).
8
706 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2013).
9
752 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2014).
10
235 Ariz. 347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).
11
771 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2014).
12
793 F.3d 304 (3rd Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 579 U.S. ___ (2016).
13
811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016), request for rehearing denied,
__ F.3d __ (D.C. Cir. 2016).
14
The federal disclosure law proposed in the immediate wake of
Citizens United, the DISCLOSE Act, aimed at disclosure of independent expenditures, defined as spending that ‘‘expressly
advocat[es] the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or
at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party or its agents.’’
11 C.F.R. x 100.16(a). We note the important practical and jurisprudential distinction between independent expenditures and direct contributions to candidates. Citizens United invalidated a
ban on corporate independent expenditures, but it had no effect
on the regulation of direct contributions. Indeed, the federal
ban on corporate contributions to candidates persists today. As
a matter of law, courts apply heightened scrutiny to laws that regulate independent expenditures but are more lenient with respect
to the regulation of direct contributions to candidates. Nevertheless, regulations of both types of political spending have fared
poorly in the federal courts recently. The data and analysis that
we present is limited to direct contributions to candidates.
15
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369.
16
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)).
17
Brown v. Socialist Workers Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex.
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that compelled
disclosure of NAACP membership lists would have a repressive
effect on the right to associate because of likely harassment
against list members).
2
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where variation in disclosure rules and practices over
time provide a natural setting to test our hypotheses.
We find that contributors are only slightly less likely
to contribute in future elections in states that increase
the public visibility of campaign contributions, relative to contributors in states that do not change their
disclosure laws or practices over the same time period. This ‘‘chilling’’ of speech amounts to a two percentage point decrease in future contributions,
though in most of our models the estimates are indistinguishable from zero, with narrow confidence intervals around zero. Our findings have important
implications for the jurisprudence on campaign finance disclosure. In addition to the negligible overall
effect, we find no difference in the willingness to
contribute among small donors or ideological outliers, despite a long-standing assumption that these
groups are disproportionately affected by disclosure.

THE BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF DISCLOSURE
Giving money to a candidate for public office is one
of many forms of political participation (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The decision whether
to vote, contact your representative, volunteer for a
campaign, or give money to a candidate has traditionally been characterized as an individual-level calculation of expected costs and benefits (Ansolabehere, De
Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003; Gerber and Lupia
1995). In recent years, scholars have also shown
how structural factors, such as income inequality, affect political participation (Gilens 2014; Schlozman,
Verba, and Brady 2013) and how social networks
play a critical role in the decision to vote (Rolfe
2012). Whatever one’s motivation for contributing to
a political campaign, the disclosure of these contributions carries additional potential costs and benefits.
The benefits of disclosure are generally considered
to be diffuse and to accrue to the public, while the costs
are more personal to the individual and candidate. The
public benefits of disclosure are ‘‘almost certainly
overstated’’ (Briffault 2003), yet disclosure’s potential
advantages have allure. The two main governmental
interests contemplated by Buckley and its progeny,
disseminating information and combating corruption,
are considered to accrue to society at large:
disclosure provides the electorate with information ‘as to where political campaign

money comes from and how it is spent by
the candidate’ in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows
voters to place each candidate in the political
spectrum more precisely than is often possible
solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate’s
financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be
responsive, and thus facilitate predictions of
future performance in office . disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid
the appearance of corruption by exposing
large contributions and expenditures to the
light of publicity. This exposure may discourage those who would use money for improper
purposes either before or after the election.18
Disclosure provides information. Voters might use
campaign finance information as a heuristic, an informational shortcut that allows low-information
voters to vote as if they had more ‘‘encyclopedic’’
knowledge (Lupia 1994). Quantifying the information benefit is difficult, though a few scholars are
making headway (Primo 2013; Fortier and Malbin
2013; Carpenter 2009). For example, experimental
evidence has shown that the effects of attack ads
are neutralized when donors are revealed (Dowling
and Wichowsky 2015). Other research reveals different ways that voters demand disclosure and punish anonymity (Dowling and Wichowsky 2013).
Information about contributions also can be difficult
to interpret (Sullivan 1998), though recent improvements to search and filtering functions in campaign
finance databases make interpretation easier. As for
the other contemplated benefit in Buckley, the anticorruption benefit, most individual donations are
small and unlikely to present opportunities for
quid pro quo corruption (Bauer and Issacharoff
2015). Thus, most campaign contributions are likely
better understood as a traditional form of political
participation by donors rather than an investment
in policy outcomes (Ansolabehere 2007).
Another potential benefit of disclosure is that it
enables contributors to credibly signal their alignment with a candidate or platform (Gilbert 2013),
a signal that can later be used to gain access to
the elected official (Kalla and Broockman 2015).

18

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67.
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The availability of the signaling benefit varies
with the strength of the disclosure regime, though
candidates can always know who their contributors
are19 regardless of whether they must disclose information about their contributors to the public.20
The cost of disclosure can be large and vary with the
composition of the disclosure regime in which the contributions are made. Disclosure imposes privacy costs
on individual contributors (La Raja 2014).21 Contributors might worry that exposure will hurt their business,
that the information collected will result in junk mail,
or that they will be harassed for their political opinions (McGeveran 2003; Mayer 2010). Candidates
have expressed a reluctance to remind contributors
that their information will be disclosed in part because the candidates estimate that privacy concerns
are large (Carpenter et al. 2014).
We note a contributor’s behavior can be affected by
disclosure rules even without knowing the details of
the campaign finance disclosure laws governing the
election to which she is contributing. In places with
strong disclosure rules and good data accessibility,
all she has to do is happen upon the information online,
perhaps on her newspaper’s website. Or she might find
it incidentally, in the course of looking up an employer, a name, or street, all of which are linked to databases of campaign contributions in some states.
When Proposition 8, the referendum opposing same
sex marriage in California, was pending, enterprising
activists searched contribution data for those who supported Proposition 8 and linked it to the addresses of
the donors, producing a geo-tagged and interactive
map that circulated online and eventually was the
source of harassment for some Proposition 8 supporters. California’s disclosure requirements made the
map possible. One did not have to be aware of the
laws and regulations themselves to know that contributions are highly visible in California. From this
logic we develop our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Disclosure causes donors to stop
contributing. Contributors are less likely to make
future contributions in states that increase the visibility of contributions relative to states that do not
increase the visibility of contributions over the
same time period.
Asymmetries of benefits and costs
As the Supreme Court conceded in Buckley, ‘‘It
is undoubtedly true that public disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter
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some individuals who otherwise might contribute.’’22 In other words, the costs and benefits of disclosure may not fall on all participants equally
because some contributors internalize the costs differently. In Buckley the Court hypothesized that
smaller contributors would be more elastic to disclosure rules: ‘‘[c]ontributors of relatively small
amounts are likely to be especially sensitive to recording or disclosure of their political preferences.
These strict requirements may well discourage participation by some citizens in the political process, a
result that Congress hardly could have intended.’’23
The ACLU has expressed a similar concern, arguing
that ‘‘the [political] system is not strengthened by
chilling the speech and invading the privacy of modest donors to controversial causes’’ (ACLU 2010). If
‘‘small’’ or ‘‘modest’’ donors are disproportionately
impacted by disclosure rules, their privacy concerns
may cause them to drop out of the donor pool when
disclosure rules are strengthened.24
It is possible, however, that the Supreme Court is
wrong about the unique sensitivity of small donors
to disclosure. Indeed, several authors note that
information about large contributions is likely a
better heuristic than information about smaller contributions (Briffault 2010; La Raja 2007; Fung, Graham, and Weil 2007), in part because small-time
19

Ackerman and Ayres (2002) have proposed to anonymize political donations. In theory, anonymous contributions would
render moot the informational asymmetry between candidates
and the public and also combat quid pro quo corruption as officeholders would not know who supported them and thus
would not be able to reward large donors.
20
Candidates might also benefit from disclosure, insofar as they
might like to publicize the composition of their donor pools—
for populist claims—or use the deluge of information to hide
less desirable contributions. But voluntary disclosure is always
possible for candidates—indeed, around 17% of our data involves disclosure of contributions below the legal thresholds.
So a legal change should not prevent candidates from disclosing, if they think this benefit outweighs the costs described
below.
21
The public faces costs, too. Ramping up disclosure requires
fiscal expenditures to support data conversion and storage,
though these costs are likely a one-time expenditure that becomes negligible over time. Whatever the expense, public
costs cannot explain behavioral impacts of disclosure laws.
22
424 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added).
23
424 U.S. at 83.
24
It is also possible that small donors would drop out of the
donor pool because candidates would stop soliciting their donations. If the administrative costs to candidates are sufficiently
burdensome, they might forgo the solicitation of small-money
donors in favor of rich donors where the net gain—money received minus the administrative costs related to disclosure—
is highest.
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donations lack both informational and anticorruption value (Briffault 2012b; Hasen 2010). If this is
true, then large donors may drop out of the donor
pool at a higher rate when disclosure rules are
strengthened because their contributions would be
disproportionately scrutinized. For example, rather
than contributing large amounts directly to candidates, large donors may seek refuge in organizations
established to circumvent disclosure, such as organizations governed by section 501c of the tax code
(Briffault 2012a). In other words, even if we observe large donors dropping out the of pool of contributors, these donors may continue to participate
in a less visible realm.
Hypothesis 2: The rate at which donors drop out
depends on the size of contribution. Compared to
donors in states that do not strengthen disclosure of
campaign contributions, repeat contributions will decrease among the smallest and the largest contributors in states that strengthen their disclosure laws.25
Would-be contributors who opt out might do so
for at least two reasons related to privacy. The
first reason would be to avoid unwanted attention.
The second reason is related to homophily (La
Raja 2014; Mutz 2002). Individuals may fear that
disclosure will expose their political allegiances
to neighbors, colleagues, and friends (McClurg
2006). This fear is likely greater where individuals
are ideologically dissimilar from their neighbors
and friends, as La Raja showed in a recent survey
experiment. The ACLU’s concern about deterring
contributions to controversial candidates, and conservatives’ concerns about businesses being hurt
by revelation of political activities, both speak to
homophily and privacy concerns.
Hypothesis 3: Ideological outliers will drop
out of donor pool at a higher rate. In states that
strengthen disclosure of campaign contributions,
contributors who are ideologically distant from
their neighbors will opt out of the donor pool at a
higher rate than contributors in states that do not
change their laws.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF STATE
CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE
We test our three hypotheses using a panel dataset of more than 175,000 individual contributors to
state gubernatorial and legislative campaigns between 2000 and 2008. In particular, we compare

the pool of campaign contributors in states that
strengthened their disclosure rules and practices
between 2004 and 2008 (our ‘‘treatment’’ states)
to the pool of campaign contributors in states that
did not change their disclosure rules and practices
(our ‘‘control’’ states). There are fourteen ‘‘treatment’’
states and nine ‘‘control’’ states in our sample. See
Figure 1. By construction, no treatment states had
very high disclosure scores at the beginning of the
time period or very low disclosure scores at the end
of the time period.
Data
In order to divide the states into groups, we rely
on state scores produced by the Campaign Disclosure Project (CDP), an annual report authored
by subject-area experts from both academia and
law.26 The CDP evaluated every state’s campaign
finance laws and data accessibility for the years
2003–2005 and 2007–2008.
We use the CDP’s state disclosure scores to measure the strength of each state’s disclosure regime.
The CDP grades states on four dimensions: (1)
de jure language; (2) electronic filing; (3) content
accessibility; and (4) user-friendliness of the data.
Each dimension comprises a handful of measures,
which are further divided into dozens of submeasures, coded by campaign finance experts. Our
identification of treatment and control states is
based on the aggregate score of all measures in all
four dimensions for each state. Aspects of these
(largely technologically driven) changes noted by
the CDP between 2004 and 2008 appear in each
dimension, so we also cannot isolate the discrete impact of small or individual changes.27 Table 1 presents summary data for the years in the dataset.
25

We operationalize our second hypothesis by identifying individuals who make the smallest and the largest contributions in successive elections; comparing the percentage of donors during
election cycle ECt–1 who give again in election cycle ECt. Equally
important is the effect of disclosure on potential contributors who
decide not to give in the wake of disclosure rules, regardless of
past behavior. By definition, these individuals are unobserved,
and our findings do not directly speak to their behavior.
26
Our use of expert-informed data follows a tradition of using
similar data in both political science and economics. See,
e.g., Clinton and Lewis (2008) and Fisman and Miguel
(2007). More fine-grained data would allow us to make more
precise claims about which aspects of disclosure impose the
most costs.
27
A full description of the Campaign Disclosure Project’s
(CDP’s) methodology and discussion of its limits is presented
in Appendix A.1.
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FIG. 1. States with no change compose our control group (n = 9). States that strengthened their disclosure rules and practices
compose our treatment group (n = 14). Note that Kansas and Vermont are dropped from the ideology analysis for lack of zip
code data.

States that improved their disclosure score by
three or more points between 2004 and 2008 are
coded as ‘‘treatment’’ states, and states with no measured improvement in their disclosure regime over
the same time period are our controls. Our main results are robust to using alternative thresholds as
cutpoints.28 Many disclosure improvements in the
treatment states involve access to information and
were not accomplished via new legislation or administrative rules but instead by simple improvements to data accessibility, such as improving the
user interface for state websites and making campaign contribution data searchable and downloadable. Some states enabled searching by name,
geographical location (address, zip code, etc.), or
employer (usually for larger amounts). Others mandated electronic filing between 2004 and 2008,
which greatly improved the searchability of data.
Reporting thresholds were unchanged in all treatment states except North Carolina, which slightly

decreased its threshold, from $100 to $50, and
New Jersey, which decreased from $400 to $300.
Because most improvements analyzed by the CDP
did not, in fact, involve changes to disclose laws
(their most heavily weighted category), we followed
up on each state in the sample, pinpointing the
changes that we could observe in treatment states
and verifying that no important changes were
made in control states, using a combination of the
CDP coders’ summaries, which captured changes
in data accessibility and web navigation that are
no longer observable, and our independent Westlaw
searches to find legal changes over the time period.
See Appendix D.
Our data on campaign contributions and political
ideology are drawn from the Database on Ideology,
Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Bonica
2013) which includes contributions data from the
National Institute on Money in State Politics
(NIMSP).29 NIMSP, and in turn DIME, collect the
contributor’s zip code, recipient’s name, recipient’s

Table 1. Summary Statistics
of Disclosure Scores Over Time
Year

Min

Mean

Max

St. Dev.

2003
2004
2005
2007
2008

0
0
0
0
0

1.39
1.44
1.96
3.26
4.13

5
5
8
9
9

1.75
1.83
2.31
3.21
3.51

28

We present the results of a two point cutoff in Appendix C.1.
The results are even closer to zero, as expected.
29
National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP) data
can be downloaded at <http://www.transparencydata.com/
bulk/>. This data is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 United States
License by NIMSP.
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Table 2. Balance Between Treatment and Control States on Measures of Political Competition,
per Capita Political Spending, and Average Ideology of Contributor

Characteristic
Individual-level characteristics
Amount per capita per seat in 2000 state elections
Relative amount contributed per seat in prior election
Relative amount contributed per state in prior election
Average contributor ideology score, 2000 (Std. dev.)
State-level characteristics
Share of state population contributing to same-state candidates in 2000
Voter turnout 2004
Presence of divided government, 1994–2004
Size of legislative min. party under divided government, 1994–2004
Average number of seats up for election
Numeric Disclosure Scores in pre-period

state, recipient’s party, target seat, amount contributed, and the date of the contribution.30
Among the 23 states in our sample, more than one
million individuals contributed half a billion dollars
to 15,995 candidates for 5,553 contested seats for
statewide office in 2000, 2004, and 2008. We subset
the data to the 175,644 individuals who made a contribution during the 2000 election cycle and analyze
the behavior of this panel in subsequent statewide
elections. We track the raw amount contributed by
each contributor in the panel as well as a relative
measure of each contributor’s impact, which divides
the individual’s contribution(s) by the total contributions to the seat in question.31
We use DIME ideology scores to identify the ideology of each contributor. DIME uses common contributors to state and federal races to bridge ideology
estimations across different types of races in a method
that improves upon other well-known ideology estimation efforts, such as NOMINATE scores (Bonica
2014; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). We use
the DIME estimates to generate a measure of the
absolute value of the distance between each contributor’s ideology and the average ideology of his or her
zip code,32 using the most recent pre-treatment measure of ideological distance.33 Almost all DIME
estimates range from -2 to 2. As we explain in
Appendix A2, we reduced the data by 0.1% by cutting contributors who fell outside of the DIME range.
Balance checks
The cleanest designs for causal inference in a
non-experimental context demonstrate balance between two groups and then use a simple difference

Treatment

Control

p-Value
(t-test)

$0.06
0.008
0.00008
0.12 (0.77)

$0.01
0.05
0.0007
0.49 (0.86)

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 –

0.008
0.63
0.66
0.40
115.6
1.8

0.0008
0.64
0.51
0.38
60.0
0.8

0.03
0.65
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.19

in means as a causal estimate. Here, there are
small but statistically significant differences between contributors in treatment and control states.
We therefore use fixed effects probability models
and controls to correct for imbalance.34
Table 2 examines balance on key covariates using
pre-treatment data. The differences for amounts
contributed are substantively fairly small, but they
30

The Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections
(DIME) uses fuzzy matching to link records. For information
on the accuracy of matches on a training set (fairly high, but
not perfect), see the supplemental materials to Bonica (2014).
31
For 2000 contributors who gave again in 2004, we use the
maximum of their relative contributions in 2004 (if they gave
to multiple seats) as a measure of their relative importance. If
contributors skipped the 2004 election, we use maximum of
their relative contributions for the year 2000 as their measure
of relative importance in that election.
32
We note one important caveat about our process of using zip
codes in the DIME data. The data contains both missing and
misreported zip codes. After omitting two states that did not report zip codes in 2000, 3.7% of contributor zip codes are misreported in 2000 (6,163 of 164,278). The number drops sharply
when we examine misreported zip codes among the 2000 contributors who gave in 2004 (974 of 41,374 contributors to both
elections) and 2008 (502 of 30,071 repeat contributors). Despite
several attempts, we have not found a way that our results are
confounded by the missing data. For a full explanation, see
Appendix A.3.
33
If a contributor gave in 2000 but not 2004, we use the ideological distance in 2000. If they gave in both 2000 and 2004, we
use the ideological distance in 2004. (Ideological distance
changed very little over the time period, with the median and
mean difference over time for 2000 and 2004 contributors
being 0.02.) For measures of ideological distance, we omit
zip codes that have only one contributor, which removes
0.1% of contributors from the data.
34
The primary imbalance is from the sheer size of the two
groups—approximately 94% of the contributors are in treatment states. Nevertheless, the groups overlap almost completely for the key individual-level covariates.
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are statistically significant because of our large
sample size. Contributors in control states give
less money per capita per seat (one cent, compared
to six cents in treatment states), but the relative importance of each contributor is higher in control
states than treatment states, whether measured relative to other contributors to the race or relative to all
contributors in the state.
Contributor ideology is also unbalanced between
the treatment and control groups. The range of political ideology in both groups of states is similar,
but contributors in control states are more conservative. The differences are reflected in the interquartile ranges. The interquartile range of contributor
ideology is -0.44 to 0.79 for treatment states and
-0.09 to 1.12 in control states. Contributors in treatment states have a mean ideology score of 0.12
(s.d. = 0.77), and candidates in control states average 0.49 (s.d. = 0.86). The mean differences are
not large, but the distribution of ideologies is clearly
not equivalent. We therefore control for ideology in
our models.
Political competition might affect a state’s probability of strengthening campaign finance disclosure
requirements, as incumbents attempt to erect barriers
to entry for challengers. We test balance on measures
of political competition, including the presence or
absence of divided government, the size of the
minority party, and the number of seats being challenged in an election. As the table indicates, balance
is mixed on the measures of political competition,
though substantively, differences are not large. This
is also true for pre-period disclosure scores.35
The balance statistics provide some foundation
for our inferences about the effect of disclosure.
Our use of individual-level controls for ideology
and amount, combined with techniques that account
for the clustered nature of the data and the fact that
treatment occurs at the state level, strengthen the
validity of our findings.36

METHODS AND FINDINGS
In order to estimate the effect of disclosure on
contributors, we leverage the difference in state
disclosure regimes over time in a difference-indifferences design that takes advantage of the rich
individual-level data available. A difference-indifferences design does not assume that the control
group is exchangeable for the treatment group, as
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is assumed in the experimental context. Instead,
the difference-in-differences design takes as a starting point that treatment is not randomly distributed
and requires a weaker assumption than exchangeability. The design assumes that in the absence of
treatment, the treatment and control groups would
have followed a parallel time trend. Any deviations
in the treatment group’s time trend are assumed to
be caused by the treatment. We conduct our analysis
on a panel of campaign contributors from the 2000
elections. Following a panel of contributors over time
supports the parallel time trends assumption in the
difference-in-differences design, because it holds individual contributors constant, rather than allowing
the population of donors to change each year.
We derive our estimates using a linear regression
with state fixed effects. We use clustered bootstrapping to correct for the fact that contributors are clustered within states. We run 1,000 replications of
each estimate, drawing a random sample of states,
with replacement, and report 90% confidence intervals
on the median estimate.37 Our confidence intervals
35
Our study coincides with several same-sex marriage campaigns. Same-sex marriage was on the ballot in Arizona and
Arkansas, both treatment states, and in two states that are not
in our sample (California and Florida). We do not measure contributions for ballot initiatives. Nevertheless, there is a chance
that contributors in Arizona and Arkansas were either more
(policy-oriented) or less (privacy-concerned) likely to support
candidates with strong stances on same-sex marriage in the
post-period, which our data could pick up. Arizona and Arkansas comprise 10% of the treatment state contributors in the year
2000 and 7% of the repeat contributors in 2008, but the attrition
in those states (85% in Arkansas and 90% in Arizona) was
equal to or higher than the average attrition across treatment
states (85% for all states, 84% not including Arizona and
Arkansas).
36
Following Rosenbaum (1999) we note that in an observational study of this nature, generalizability is a secondary concern to making the cleanest possible causal inference, though
with 46% of the states in the country under analysis, we think
generalizability is fairly strong here.
37
Confidence intervals provide more information than simple
rejection tests of the null hypothesis. In particular, hypothesis
tests require the user to define a threshold, m, that distinguishes
between negligible and non-negligible effects. The value of m is
often arbitrary and sometimes as contested as the statistical tests
used to identify effects. In some cases, courts have adopted a
particular m (a ‘‘bright line’’) to aid lawmakers, watchdogs,
and judges in future cases. There is no such threshold in First
Amendment law. As a result, our interpretation is guided by
90% confidence intervals because they ‘‘. contain the same information as two one-sided tests and, compared to p-values,
[are] simpler for applied researchers to implement and easier
for readers to interpret. Confidence intervals also provide readers with important information about the robustness of the test
to the choice of m . ’’ (Rainey 2014).
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based on clustered bootstrapping are less biased
than robust-clustered standard errors (Harden
2011). We explain more about our methodology
in Appendix A.
Average effects
We first examine the general question of whether
contributors are deterred by disclosure. We subset
the data to the people in the sample who contributed
to same-state candidates in the year 2000. We then
compare rates of continued participation over time
in treatment and control states. We expect similar
rates in treatment and control states in 2004, when
no states in the sample had big changes in disclosure, and a difference to emerge by 2008, by
which time the treatment states had made contributions more visible. If contributors are deterred by
enhanced disclosure, then we should observe a divergence in the probability of repeat contributions
after the treatment states make contributions more
visible. The unit of analysis is contributor-cycle
for 2004 and 2008 cycles (two observations per
contributor).
We run the following linear probability model:
Y ¼ a þ b1 T þ b2 P þ b3 ðT  PÞ þ y1 C þ y2 F þ e

where Y indicates (0, 1) whether the contributor
gave to a state candidate in a given cycle, T indicates
whether the contributor is in a treatment state, P
indicates the ‘‘post’’ period (2008), C is a vector
of individual-level controls for amount given in
the pre-period and pre-period ideology, and F is a
fixed effect for every state in the sample, which is
intended to control for any state-specific features
that could confound our inference, particularly
unobservable ones. The coefficient of interest is
the difference in differences reported in b3, which
estimates the 2008 – 2004 probability of contributing among treatment-state contributors, minus the
same probability among control-state contributors.
If the estimate is negative, then treatment state contributors have a lower probability of contributing in
2008 than we would expect in the absence of treatment, using the control group’s time trend as a counterfactual. Our error term, e, is normally assumed to
be independent and identically distributed, but we
know that the data is clustered at the state level,
which violates the independence assumption. To account for the clustering in the data, we use clustered
bootstrapping, as we explain above.38

Table 3. Average Effects of Increased Disclosure
Among 175,644 Contributors in 14 Treatment
States and 9 Control States
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

0.2
0.41
-0.37
[0.14, 0.32]
[0.03, 0.94] [-0.51, -0.27]
Treatment
0.02
0.06
0.03
[-0.14, 0.13] [-0.47, 0.27] [-0.15, 0.22]
Post
-0.06
-0.06
-0.07
[-0.07. -0.03] [-0.11, -0.02] [-0.09, -0.05]
Treatment · -0.02
-0.02
-0.03
Post
[-0.04, 0.01] [-0.06, 0.03] [-0.04, -0.01]
Ideology
-0.03
0.11
[-0.04, -0.01] [0.09, 0.12]
log(Rel. amt.
0.04
per seat)
[0.03, 0.05]
log(Amount)
0.03
[-0.14, 0.17]
State fixed
effects
yes
yes
yes
Intercept

All members of the sample contributed in the year 2000. Dependent
variable is whether the contributors gave again in a subsequent cycle
(2004 or 2008). Difference-in-differences estimates of the difference
in contribution percentages in 2008 and 2004 for treatment and control
groups are shown in boldface. Confidence intervals (90%) are provided
below the estimates. They are generated with clustered bootstrapping
(1,000 replications).

The results of the basic difference-in-differences
estimation are presented in Table 3, where Model 1
presents the basic difference-in-differences result,
and Models 2 and 3 introduce controls for ideology
and amount, including relative amount per seat. So
that we can capture the most recent measure of
amount for each contributor, we use the amount
from 2004 where the contributor gave in 2004,
and from 2000 where she did not.39
The coefficient of interest is the difference-indifferences, from the interaction between Treatment and Post, shown in boldface. For all three
models, the estimate is very small, either a two
or three percentage point decrease in repeat contributions below the level of contributions we would
have expected, taking the time trend for control
states as our counterfactual time trend. While the

38

With a binary dependent variable, logistic regression is a possibility. We opt for linear probability models (LPM) for ease of
interpretation, particularly on interaction terms that are central
to our analysis. For a discussion of the similarities of LPM and
logit/probit regression, including the limits of LPM, see Angrist
and Pischke (2009).
39
This decision does not affect our results. Indeed, when it
comes to amount contributed, repeat donors are creatures of
habit—the modal difference in amount is 0.
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confidence intervals for two of the three estimates
cross zero, we can rule out non-negligible negative
effects by examining the lower end of the confidence intervals, which are -0.04 and -0.06. In
other words, with 1,000 replications of the estimate
using randomly selected treatment and control
states, 90% of the estimates were no larger than a
six percentage point decrease below that which
we would have expected in the counterfactual
world in which the treatment states did not improve
disclosure.40
We illustrate our expectations by interpreting the
coefficients from Model 1. In Model 1, we observe
that 22% of treatment group contributors to state
campaigns in the year 2000 contributed again in
2004 (a + b1), compared to 20% of control group
contributors (a). By 2008, both groups retained
14% of contributors from the year 2000 as repeat
contributors (treatment level is a + b1 + b2 + b3,
and control level is a + b2). The larger drop in
participation among the treatment group (from
22% to 14%) results in the negative difference-indifferences estimate of -0.02 (b3). Using the control
group’s time trend of a six percentage point decrease, we would have expected 16% of treatment
group contributors to participate in 2008. We further
note that the smallest estimated level of participation for the treatment group, given the lower
bound of the confidence interval on b3 (-0.04),
is 12%, or two percentage points less than participation by contributors in states with no changes
in disclosure.
Of course, small percentages of large populations
can still mean that a lot of people are affected, or
that the effect is otherwise non-negligible. What
does a two percentage point drop mean in terms
of actual contributors who opt out? How many potential contributors does each candidate lose as a result of enhanced contribution visibility? The point
estimate of -0.02, when multiplied by the number
of treatment state contributors in 2000, means that
3,293 contributors in treatment states whom we otherwise would expect to have observed contributing
in the absence of their contributions becoming
more visible opted out of contributing above the disclosure threshold in 2008. On average, that represents 235 contributors per treatment state. In 2008
there were 3,983 candidates campaigning for
1,453 seats in the treatment states. In other words,
our results show that about two donors per district,
or less than one (0.83) donor per candidate, dropped
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out of the donor pool between 2000 and 2008. Reasonable minds might disagree, but we interpret this
finding as a negligible effect.41
Alternatively, it could be that there is a generalized disclosure effect and that the low repeat rate
in the time period we study is related to the way
the world changed in both treatment and control
states due to the increased attention to disclosure
generally. To investigate whether a generalized
disclosure effect could be occurring, we analyzed
donor repeat rates in two additional time periods,
1992–2000 and 1996–2004, which are considered
pre-treatment for our purposes but for which we
do not have information about state disclosure laws
and regulations. Among the 1996 contributors, 19%
contributed again in 2000 and 11% in 2004.
Among the 1992 contributors, 8.6% contributed
again in 1996 and 5.5% in 2000, though the DIME
data contains information for only four states from
our sample over that time period and is therefore a
poorer proxy for our larger sample. Nevertheless,
both estimates are lower than the 20%–22% repeat
rates we observe between 2000 and 2004 and 14%
from 2004 to 2008. Repeat contribution rates are simply very low over time, and the 2000–2008 time
frame does not seem to be an outlier.42

40

Interpretations of actual levels of giving are noisy due to the
sensitivity of the intercept to the small size of the control group
relative to the treatment group.
41
We can repeat the analysis with the most negative lower bound
of the confidence intervals in Table 3, which is -0.06. Ninety
percent of the estimates in our bootstrapping exercise estimate
that fewer than 9,880 contributors opted out in treatment states
where we would otherwise expect them to contribute above the
contribution threshold in 2008. That means that the outer limit
on the observed estimates is 705 contributors missing per treatment state, 6.8 per district, and 2.5 per candidate.
42
A second way we could understand a generalized disclosure
effect is as a violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)—that changes in the treatment states bled over to
the control states. We cannot rule out a SUTVA violation. There
were no major changes at the federal level that would cause donors in control states to be more aware of disclosure generally,
so any violation would have to come from contributors in control states somehow learning that candidates for state office in
treatment states were now subject to additional disclosure, or
that the secretary of state office in treatment states decided to
change various features of their websites. We think neither is
likely, particularly given the very valid concern of both reviewers that the states do not seem to have communicated the disclosure changes directly to the public in their own states, much less
across states. Nevertheless, if there is a SUTVA violation, it
would bias our findings toward a null result, which is undesirable in an article arguing for a negligible result. We thank an
anonymous reviewer for bringing this challenge to our attention.
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FIG. 2. Repeat contributions in a given state election cycle, grouped based on amount contributed in 2000 to state elections.
Estimates are calculated with clustered bootstrapping of the difference-in-differences regressions (1,000 replications). The percentage of repeat contributors decreases in control states (solid black line) and decreases slightly more in treatment states (dashed,
medium gray line) in the wake of enhanced visibility. As before, these effects are not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Heterogeneous treatment effects by amount
The Supreme Court has expressed special concern about the disclosure of small donors and ideological outliers. We hypothesize that people giving
relatively large and/or small contributions will
be more likely to opt out when the visibility of
contributions increases, compared to those giving
intermediate amounts (Hypothesis 2). If donating
to political campaigns is about buying access and
policy favors, then those giving less money have
less of a reason to expose their small contributions,
for which their expected policy and access benefits
are limited. And those giving large contributions
might choose to participate via less visible avenues
for fear of exposing their large resources or giving
the impression that they are trying to buy policy favors. If, however, contributing is about participation
in the process and signaling one’s involvement to
others, we might not see more opting out among
small or large contributors when the contributions
are more easily accessed by the public.
Figure 2 shows repeat contributions across state
elections for donors that gave different amounts in
2000. The subgroups are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, with consideration of both the range of the
contribution size and the group size.43 Figure 2
plots the treatment and control groups separately,
using results from the following regression, run on
each subgroup in the data, by amount:
Yis ¼ a þ b1 Ts þ b2 P þ b3 ðT  PÞ þ yFs þ e

where the variables and coefficients are interpreted
as described above, in the main difference-in-

differences analysis, and 90% confidence intervals
are bootstrapped at the state level.44 Because we divide the data into various subgroups and analyze by
subgroup, we lose a lot of statistical power, and our
confidence intervals widen. We are therefore unable
to draw strong statistical conclusions about the nature of the heterogeneous effects, though the effect
appears similarly negligible to the aggregate effect.
We present the difference-in-differences estimates
graphically here and include a table with the regression results in Appendix B.
As Figure 2 shows, as the size of the contribution
increases, the overall tendency to contribute in a
subsequent election increases in both treatment
and control states. Among those who contributed
in 2000, donors of less than $100 have around a
14% rate of repeating their participation in 2004,
whereas donors of $1,000 or more have around a
38% rate of repeating their participation in 2004.
Simply put, repeat players are more likely to contribute big amounts, and big contributors are likely
to be repeat players.
In each panel, the percent of repeat contributors
decreases between 2004 and 2008, which is natural,
given that some attrition is to be expected in a panel
study. In general, we see that the percent of repeat
43

Contribution data is clumpy, as contributors tend to give
amounts in multiples of $50. Contributors of $100 and $250,
for example, make up almost 40% of the data.
44
Here, we exclude the C term, which represents each contributor’s amount or ideology (individual-level-characteristics),
since we are now grouping on those variables to test hypotheses
2 and 3.
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contributors in treatment states, where we expected
contributors to opt out of future participation, decreases at a very similar, but slightly faster, rate
than in control states over the same time period.
Indeed, across the entire spectrum of contributors,
we see that the usual estimate of chilling participation is only a three percentage point decrease below
the counterfactual time trend presented by the control states. The estimate is indistinguishable from
zero, but its consistency across almost all of the
amount-based subgroups implies to us that there is
not a larger effect among donors of small or large
amounts.45 Nevertheless, where repeating rates are
already low, even small changes can be impactful.
Among those contributing $100 or less, treatment
state contributors were, on average, three percentage points less likely to contribute than they
would have been in the absence of the change in disclosure visibility, using the time trend of the control
states as a counterfactual. Control state contributors
decreased repeat participation from 14% to 10%,
and treatment state contributors decreased from
16% to 9%. Assuming that, in the absence of the increase in visibility of contributions, the repeating
percentage in treatment states would have followed
a parallel time trend to the control states, we would
have expected the treatment state contributors to decrease from their initial 16% to 12%. In other
words, we observe 25% fewer repeat contributors
among small donors than we would have expected
(though the estimate is indistinguishable from
zero). The three percentage point difference does
not seem to be due to an additional burden on
small donors brought about by enhanced disclosure
(since almost all subgroups experience the same
difference-in-differences). Among those contributing $1,000 or more, the story is similar, but the effect is much smaller, both as a point estimate and
in relation to the baseline level of repeating.46 The
Supreme Court has disavowed an interest in leveling
the playing field in terms of the amounts contributed
and spent in politics. Disclosure can provide information about this interest. While our results lack
the statistical power to be definitive, it appears the
playing field is relatively level, despite differences
in the baseline repeat participation rate.
Heterogeneous treatment effects by ideology
Our third hypothesis is that the privacy costs of
enhanced visibility are more salient among contri-
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butors who are ideological outliers. In the case of
ideology, the motivation to opt out is driven by the
desire to avoid revealing that one’s politics are at
odds with the surrounding political culture, one’s
neighbors, or one’s friends. We proxy local political
culture using zip code level data.47 As an example,
we suspect that a supporter of a socialist candidate
will be more likely to stop contributing to socialist
candidates in the wake of disclosure enhancements
when the contributor lives in a conservative zip code
like 75225 (Dallas, Texas) rather than a relatively
liberal zip code like 94709 (Berkeley, California).
Similarly, a contribution to a Republican candidate
may be more likely to be suppressed by enhanced
disclosure in 94709 than in 75225.
Our measure of ideological distance differs
from one recently used in an experimental setting
(La Raja 2014). Our measure is solely based on
physical proximity, which can vary depending on
the population of the zip code. La Raja asked respondents about whether their political views differed from people in ‘‘your family, coworkers,
45
Because only 2 of our 14 treatment states reduced the disclosure threshold, we think that an increased administrative burden
cannot explain these results, particularly since they would be
expected to affect contributors at the more ‘‘modest’’ end of
the contribution spectrum, who are already not likely to repeat
their contributions.
46
Because of variations in cost of living across the states, as
well as the different state sizes represented by the two groups,
we have repeated this analysis using relative amount measures
based on the seat and state. When we use relative amounts, the
difference-in-difference estimates are more likely to be positive, particularly among relatively smaller contributors. The
lowest low end of a confidence interval for any panel is
-0.08, though confidence intervals tend to be wider than
those reported in Figure 2. This is probably due, in part, to
the imbalance in the sizes of treatment and control groups in
some panels, and our requirement that at least two control
and two treatment states appear in each randomization, since
one of each is a reference category. We failed to find at least
two control states that had enough contributors to identify an effect in panels about 80% of the time, meaning that the estimates
described here are drawn from fewer successful replications
(around 200).
47
Zip codes are admittedly an imperfect proxy for geography,
though they do reflect several relevant characteristics of neighborhoods, such as ease of travel and the volume of mail. We
note some important data-centric challenges, including the
missing or incorrect zip codes described above (dropped for
this analysis), and some cases (0.2% of the sample) where
our subject was the sole contributor from his or her zip code
(also dropped for this analysis). Future researchers might be interested to know that the DIME data provides estimated latitude
and longitude coordinates for each contributor, which may provide more precise measures of geographic proximity between
contributors, to the extent the coordinates are reliable.
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FIG. 3. Repeat contributions to same-state candidates by 2000 contributors in the years 2004 and 2008, grouped by contributors’
ideological distance from others in their zip codes. Difference-in-differences estimates with 90% confidence intervals reported. All
confidence intervals cross zero, though none is less than -0.07. Ideological outliers within their zip codes (outermost panels) are
not affected any more than those who are more aligned with their neighbors (inner panels).

and neighborhood.’’ Family and friends can live
anywhere, and coworkers might or might not live
in the same zip code. So La Raja’s measure captures an aspect of homophily that ours does not—
the subjective impression of would-be contributors. On the other hand, our measure is able to detect
whether the direction of the ideological distance
matters—whether a contributor to the right of the
zip code is more likely to opt out than one to the left
of the zip code.
Figure 3 shows the effects of ideological distance
from one’s neighbors for contributors along the political spectrum (negative numbers are less conservative, positive numbers are more conservative),
between treatment and control states.48 The values
in Figure 3 represent the ideological distance from
the mean political ideology of a contributor’s zip
code, not the absolute ideology value for each contributor. For example, a conservative living in a
fairly conservative district would have a smaller
ideological distance than a moderate conservative
living in a very liberal district.49 We also restrict
the sample to conservatives who are more conservative than the average of their zip code, and liberals
who are more liberal than the average of their zip
code in order to preserve ordering within the panels.50
We observe small changes in every panel. In the
left panel, contributors who are more liberal than
the average contributor in their zip codes were
three percentage points less likely to contribute in
2008 in control states (from 14% in 2004 to 11%
in 2008), but just two percentage points less likely
in treatment states (from 18% to 16%). Among

those farthest to the right of their neighbors, the repeat rate in control states dropped from 31% in 2004
to 21% in 2008. In treatment states, the repeat rate
dropped from 32% to 21%. The confidence intervals
for these one percentage point differences are quite
wide, due in part to the smaller sample size of each
panel, yet this finding is at least suggestive that increasing disclosure did not chill campaign contributions from ideological outliers. In fact, these outliers
were less affected by disclosure rules than contributors who are ideologically similar to their neighbors. Moreover, the lower bound of the confidence
intervals for contributors to both the left and right
of their neighbors are consistent with lower bounds
for those more aligned with their neighbors—even
the most extreme typical scenarios from the 1,000
replications do not imply that relative ideological
outliers were impacted more heavily than relative
moderates.
The panels in Figure 3 are based on each contributor’s ideological distance from the mean of the zip
code, on the assumption that geographic proximity affects contributors’ cost-benefit analyses on
48

Full model specifications are presented in Appendix B.
Further note that we retain the sign for all contributors. Thus,
we code contributors as having negative distance if they are
classified as negative on the conservatism scale (meaning ideologically more liberal than the national median voter).
50
This restriction drops 20% of the sample. We generate the
mean zip code values using the full sample, then drop donors
that we cannot properly line up in the panels. If we include
the full sample, the differing signs for these contributors counteract the effects of the limited sample, and the result is an artificial increase among moderates.
49
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FIG. 4. Repeat contributions to same-state candidates by 2000 contributors in the years 2004 and 2008, grouped by ideological
ranges. Within-panel difference-in-differences estimates with 90% confidence intervals reported. All confidence intervals cross
zero, though none is less than -0.1, and the average impact on ideological outliers is no greater than impacts on moderates.

whether to participate once their participation is
more visible. However, because a lot of disclosure
happens online, regardless of the location of the
person searching it, we repeat our analysis on contributor ideology, independent of the ideological
distance between contributors and their neighbors.
If would-be repeat contributors opt out due to concerns about exposure of their contributions online
or otherwise beyond their neighborhoods, then we
should observe supporters of extreme candidates
opting out of contributing in 2008 in treatment
states more than in control states.
Since the range of raw ideological scores is
broader than the range of ideological differences
discussed above, we slice the data even more thinly
in Figure 4, which widens our confidence intervals
of the differences in most of the panels.51 Among
those who are most liberal, the percent of repeat
contributors drops five percentage points between
2004 and 2008 in control states (16% to 11%) compared to a six percentage point drop in treatment
states (24% to 18%). Among the most conservative
contributors, the percent of repeat donors drops five
percentage points in control states (17% to 12%)
compared to just three percentage points in treatment states (12% to 9%).52 These negligible effects
are independent of the size of each contribution.
The correlation of a contributor’s ideology and the
size of her contribution is 0.06 (0.04 in the treatment
group). A one-unit increase in a contributor’s conservatism score (more than one standard deviation
given the distribution of conservatism scores) generates just 4% more spending, or approximately
$170, in an election cycle.

In summary, our analysis suggests that enhanced
disclosure has a negligible effect on contributors
who are ideological outliers, whether outliers are
defined relative to all donors or just to donors in
one’s zip code.

DISCUSSION
Our findings indicate that disclosure, particularly
in the form of increased visibility of contributions,
has a negligible deterrent effect on contributors.
Moreover, any chilling effect that we do observe
does not appear to disproportionately affect highspending contributors or ideological outliers. The
deterrent effect of disclosure on smaller donors is
similar to other donors, though the baseline rate of
contributing is disproportionately low. Our interpretation that the deterrent effect is negligible turns on
our interpretation of percentages and not overall
numbers. More than 3,000 contributors in our sample of 175,000 stopped giving in response to enhanced disclosure. Those with a fundamental view
of the First Amendment’s protection of political
51

See Appendix B for full regression estimates.
We also note that the overall contributor pool in treatment
states becomes slightly more liberal after disclosure is strengthened, with the average donor moving 0.08 to the left (-0.08). At
the same time, ideology among control state contributors shifts
slightly to the right by 0.1 (from 0.49 to 0.59). In other words,
campaign finance disclosure may also have more structural impacts by shifting the donor pool more to the left than it otherwise would be, using control states as a counterfactual. The
raw difference-in-differences is a leftward shift of -0.18 or
about 1/4 of a standard deviation.
52
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contributions will view this aggregate finding as evidence that disclosure chills speech. Our interpretation is different both because of the relative effect
size (less than one ‘‘chilled’’ donor per candidate)
and because our estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero, or no effect.53 To be clear,
this study uses the best-available measures of disclosure and campaign contributions and a rigorous
methodology, but like all causal and observational
studies, the study is only as strong as the measures
and treatment identification. The disclosure scores,
while generated by the leading legal experts in campaign finance, are blunt. There are several pathways
to any given score. One state with a score of a ‘‘B’’
might have laws that require a lot of information to
be disclosed on tight deadlines but not provide the
public with easy access to the information that is
disclosed. Another could have the opposite tendencies and still get a ‘‘B’’ due to mandatory electronic
filing, for example. The single score allows us to
compare across states, but the underlying measures
are on several dimensions.
Another challenge is the strength of the treatment
we analyze. We argue that an individual contributor
need not be told about the changes by the state (e.g.,
that the Office of the Secretary of State will now
allow contribution data to be searched by address)
and that the contributor can happen across contribution information more easily after disclosure is
strengthened, thereby ‘‘treating’’ the individual.
But it is possible that (1) only a small fraction of
contributors had the experience of ‘‘happening’’
across contribution information, and (2) had the states
announced the changes, the treatment would have
both been stronger and reached more people. This
biases our results toward finding no effect, an undesirable bias in the current project. While we know there
were changes to disclosure rules and practices and we
know that experts noticed them, we unfortunately
cannot verify that contributors also noticed them.

though we hasten to add that the rise of ‘‘dark
money’’ (expenditures made by groups that do not
disclose their donors), particularly after the years
covered by our study, means that the whole playing
field is not visible.
Campaign finance disclosure does not seem to
have the effect of deterring ideological outliers
any more than other participants in the system.
The group most likely to opt out has probably varied
over time. In the 1950s and again in the 1980s, the
court acted to protect more liberal activists and
contributors from harassment. In current times,
conservatives who oppose gay marriage might be
most worried about harassment. Nevertheless, this
research suggests that conservatives, whether measured in terms of absolute ideology or ideological
distance from one’s neighbors, are not measurably
more deterred than their liberal neighbors and compatriots. Of course, we only observe contributions
that are above the disclosure threshold. It might be
the case that more people are contributing below required disclosure thresholds or reallocating their
money from campaign contributions to disclosurefree advocacy organizations (Issacharoff and Karlan
1998). Furthermore, because of the bundled nature
of state disclosure reforms and the coarseness and
limited time series available with available disclosure data, this study cannot test the relative impacts
of discrete disclosure changes. The recent move
toward experimental evaluation of variations on
disclosure and disclaimer regimes is useful in this
regard (see e.g., La Raja 2014; Dowling and
Wichowsky 2013; Ridout, Franz, and Fowler 2014).
The federal trend to ‘‘deregulate and disclose’’
federal campaign finance has been accompanied
by a similar trend in state governments across the
country. The potential costs of this new degree of
transparency on political behavior have been understudied. In this article, we attempt to answer one of
the most pressing questions about the relationship
between campaign finance laws on the books and
electoral funding in practice. Our analysis focuses

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has long supported disclosure laws on the premise that they increase information and combat corruption or the appearance of
corruption. The court has taken for granted all
along that disclosure chills some speech. Our findings indicate that, when it comes to the effects of
disclosure on giving, the effects are negliglble,
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We do test the robustness of our findings with a placebo test
that uses federal contribution data. Because federal disclosure
rules did not change more in treatment states than in control
states over the time period, we expect to find no effect. Most estimates for heterogeneity for amount and ideology are similar in
magnitude to the findings for state contributions, though confidence intervals are much wider, given that the treatment and
control groups are essentially arbitrary. Results are presented
in Appendix C.2.
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only on the cost of disclosure, leaving analysis of
disclosure’s benefits for future work. In short, our
data show that First Amendment concerns about
disclosure from both the right and the left are probably overstated.
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APPENDIX

The Campaign Disclosure Project was a collaboration of the UCLA School of Law, the Center for
Governmental Studies and the California Voter Foundation. It was supported by The Pew Charitable Trusts.
Its list of principal investigators and participants
includes some of the most important election law experts in the country, including Daniel Lowenstein
(UCLA Law), Jessica Levinson (Loyola Law and
Los Angeles Ethics Commission), and Paul S. Ryan
(Senior Counsel, Campaign Legal Center).
We use the CDP’s state disclosure scores as a proxy
for the strength of each state’s disclosure regime,
to guide our case selection. Disclosure scores are
available for the years 2003–2005 and 2007–2008.
The scores are calculated using a 300-point system
awarded in four categories:

and independent expenditures, strong enforcement, frequent reporting requirements.
2. Electronic filing (30 points), including whether
states mandate electronic filing and maintain a
searchable database.
3. Disclosure content accessibility (75 points), including how easy and inexpensive it is to obtain
records from a distance, usually via the Internet, and ways the data could be analyzed online
(e.g., searching, filtering, online analysis, and
downloadable content).
4. Online usability (75 points), an evaluation of
the user experience on state disclosure websites,with states earning higher scores for websites that included information about the laws,
disclosure requirements, and reporting periods,
as well as original content such as the state’s
own analysis or overviews.

1. Disclosure laws (120 points), including disclosure of contributors’ occupations and employers, reporting of last minute contributions

States are assigned letter grades based on this point
system, which we convert into an ordinal numeric
scale for ease of analysis, 0 for ‘‘F’’ and 11 for ‘‘A.’’

APPENDIX A: METHODS
A.1. Case selection
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FIG. A1. Each treatment state’s 2004 Disclosure Score plotted against its improvement over time. The size of each point reflects
the overall contributor drop-off rate for the state making the improvement, with larger dots indicating larger drop-offs.

Most states improved their scores over time. In 2003
all states scored a 5 (C) or lower, with the modal
score being a 0 (F). By 2008 the median score was 6
(B-). The mean score monotonically increased over
the time period from 1.4 (between a D- and D) to
4.7 (between a C- and C).
In an ideal world, we would be able to isolate the
components of each of the subcategories that influenced the scores in each subcategory. Indeed, the
CDP published a list of the hundred or so variables
coded for each state in each year.54 However, the
data for the scoring components is unavailable.
Table D1 is our attempt to capture the changes that
we can still observe, a decade later, either because
they are in the CDP summaries for the states or because they were changes enshrined in law. We are unable to create our own measure using a tool like factor
analysis, because the only measures available—the
four sub-measures—cannot be tested for more than
one factor. While the scholars and lawyers involved
in the CDP are nationally recognized experts whose
expertise we trust, our restricted ability to look
‘‘under the hood’’ of the measure is unfortunate. The
two groups of states we identify fall cleanly into ‘‘big
change’’ and ‘‘no change’’ states, but with more finegrained data, we would have been able to do even more.
Partially as a result of the lack of fine-grained institutional information, in addition to the reality that
states generally change a shifting bundle of visibilityrelated factors over time, we are unable to do two
things. First, we are unable to test a ‘‘dose’’ response.
We cannot evaluate the relative effect of discrete institutional changes. We cannot, for example, say whether
online searchability by employer has more of a deterrent effect to political participation than mandatory
electronic filing by candidates, which makes disclosure information available more quickly. Further research, in an experimental setting, will be needed to

pin down which features of disclosure cause the greatest amount of opting out. We are also unable to rule
out that some increases in visibility might actually reduce the propensity to opt out, and that what we are
observing is the offsetting effects of two kinds of reforms working against each other, resulting in our negligible findings. Again, we think that conducting
follow-up research in laboratory experiments would
be beneficial. Appendix A.5 discusses dose response
more in-depth.

A.2. Calipers
We restrict the populations to areas of overlap, cutting 10 cases of people who gave less than $4 or
more than $688,615. We do this to ensure complete
coverage for causal inference.55 We also drop 326 contributors with ideologies that fall outside of the -2 to
2 interval, as they are so politically extreme that estimates based on their behavior might bias our results
for the rest of the population. This decision drops
0.1% of the data. (Neither decision affects our results.)

A.3. More on misreported zip codes
In addition to non-reporting of zip codes in
New Jersey and Kansas for 2000, more than 10%
of contributor zip codes in Arkansas, New Mexico,
South Carolina, Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming
were misreported as well. It seems unlikely that this
high of a percentage of misreporting could have

54
See ‘‘Grading State Disclosure Criteria,’’ at <http://www
.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate2007/appendix3.html>.
55
We trim because there is no valid counterfactual for those 10
observations.
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been initiated by the contributors, given that the rest
of the states have much lower rates of misreporting,
most below 4%. Moreover, the misreporting decreased over time. For example, Arkansas has 704
misreported zip codes in 2000 but only 91 in 2004.
Iowa had 635 in 2000 and 69 in 2004. Other states
had even more drastic reductions: Arizona, Minnesota, North Dakota, Nebraska, Oregon, Virginia, Vermont, and Wyoming all reduced misreporting by
over 90% between 2000 and 2004. The size of the
reductions strikes the researchers as related more to
technological improvements than a drastic change
in the level of trust among contributors. Furthermore,
among contributors whose zip codes are misreported
in 2000 or 2004, 1699 of them who contributed in
both elections only have an incorrect zip code in
one of the elections in which they contributed, and
they were equally likely to have an incorrect zip
code as they were to report correctly in 2000 and
later misreport in 2004. All of this points to technological or random errors more than to contributor
concerns about privacy. Therefore, we are likely excluding many randomly misreported zip codes, out
of an abundance of caution.
There is no statistically distinguishable difference
between the amounts given by those whose zip
codes are incorrect (mean $733) and those whose zip
codes are correct (mean $ 701, p = 0.61).56
If the incorrect zip codes in the NIMSP data correlate to ideology, then our estimate could misstate the
scale of the influence of ideology on opting out.
Those whose zip codes were wrongly reported in
the pre-period are slightly to the right ideologically
from those whose zip codes were not wrongly
reported (0.17 vs. 0.11, p = 0). However the distance
between them is 1/10 of a standard deviation. When
we look among misreporting in treatment and control
states, we see that the ideologies of contributors with
misreported zip codes in treatment and control (0.18
and 0.15, p = 0.38) states are closer than the ideologies of those with properly reported zip codes (0.08
and 0.54, p = 0). Among those who misreported
only in 2008, treatment states had a 0.2% misreporting rate and control states had a 0.5% misreporting
rate. It therefore seems that our results are missing
zip code information for a small number of fairly
moderate contributors, which, if anything, will
cause us to overstate the effect we observe. While
overstating is generally worrisome, here we argue
for a negligible effect, so erring on the side of overstatement is the more conservative approach.

WOOD AND SPENCER

Fixed effects regressions omit one of the fixed effect
categories as a reference category. There exists a commonly acknowledged quirk of using a treatment
dummy with fixed effect dummies in regression,
which, to our knowledge, no literature currently informs. The use of the treatment dummy means that
the fixed effects require a reference category—here,
a reference state—from both treatment and control
groups. Our statistical software, R, always drops the
alphabetically last state from each randomly selected
group of states in the cluster bootstrap process. As a
result, states like Wyoming and Washington have a
much higher probability of being omitted from analysis through the resampling process, which biases our
estimates. We therefore add a step to the resampling
process. We first require that two treatment and two
control states be selected randomly, without replacement. (We require two; otherwise the selection
would also be used as the reference category and the
run would fail because the treatment dummy would
be either all 1s or all 0s, with no ability to detect a
1-to-0 difference.) Then we randomly selected one
of the treatment and one of the control states to be
the reference category. Then we drew, with replacement, 19 more states from the full list of 23 states.
(If any of the second draw matched the states already
chosen as the reference category, we labeled them as
reference as well.) This two-step sampling process
allowed us to equalize, in expectation, the probability
that any given state would be the reference category
within the treatment and control groups over the
1,000 replications.

A.5. Is there a dose response?
We cannot detect a dose response, given the nature
of the data. Different configurations of institutions
and data availability combine to create the same
scores and same magnitudes of improvement. The
aggregated nature of the data does not permit us to
say whether, for example, effects of a three-point increase in disclosure score are more impactful from a
lower starting point.
We present below the raw repeater drop off for each
state, along with the 2004 and 2008 disclosure scores.
Figure A1 displays the information in Table A1 in a
way that might help us detect a dose response. Each
point corresponds to a state and is located at the intersection of the 2004 disclosure score for the state and

56

A.4. Clustered bootstrap methodology
Clustered bootstrapping allows us to circumvent
a known challenge with combining a treatment
dummy and fixed effects in the same regression.

Both groups have a median of $200. The lack of difference
persists when we look within group at misreporters and nonmisreporters. Among treatment group contributors, misreporters gave a mean of $637, and those without misreported zip
codes gave a mean of $662 (p = 0.55). Among control contributors, the numbers are $1,098 and $1,294, respectively
(p = 0.45).
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Table A1. Raw Data on State Disclosure Scores and Repeat Contributor Participation Decreases
from 2004 to 2008
State
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

AR
AZ
CO
IA
KS
MN
NC
NJ
NY
OK
OR
SC
VA
WV

Score 04

Score 08

Score diff

Contributor drop 04–08

0
3
4
0
0
2
3
5
2
4
2
0
3
0

3
7
8
3
3
7
7
8
8
7
9
5
9
6

3
4
4
3
3
5
4
3
6
3
7
5
6
6

-0.09
-0.12
-0.11
-0.14
-0.14
-0.08
-0.14
-0.11
-0.13
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
-0.12
-0.16

the magnitude of the 2008 improvement. The size of
the point indicates the average drop off for that state.
If starting with very little disclosure and increasing
data availability at all causes bigger effects than starting with some amount of disclosure and increasing
data availability, we would expect to see larger points
on the left side of the figure, which correspond to the

lower disclosure scores. We do not. The average effect
for states with a score of 0 in 2004 is -0.13, and the
average effect for states with a score greater than 0
in 2004 is -0.123. The average effect for states with
a score of 0 or 2 in 2004 is also -0.13, and the average
effect for states with a score greater than 2 in 2004
is -0.127.

APPENDIX B: TABLES TO SUPPORT FIGURES 2 THROUGH 4
Table B1. Repeat Contributions Among 2000 Contributors in 14 Treatment States
and 9 Control States, Analyzed Based on the Amount Contributed

Intercept
Treatment
Post
Treatment · Post

State fixed effects
Median N. Obs.

$100 or less

$101 to $249

$250 to $499

$500 to $999

> $999

0.14
[0.1, 0.24]
0.02
[-0.12, 0.26]
-0.04
[-0.06, -0.01]
-0.03
[-0.07, 0.01]

0.14
[0.1, 0.24]
0.02
[-0.12, 0.26]
-0.04
[-0.06, -0.01]
-0.03
[-0.07, 0.01]

0.17
[0.1, 0.34]
0.06
[-0.15, 0.31]
-0.04
[-0.08, -0.01]
-0.03
[-0.08, 0.02]

0.24
[0.14, 0.56]
0.06
[-0.23, 0.29]
-0.06
[-0.1, -0.02]
-0.03
[-0.08, 0.02]

0.38
[0.22, 0.79]
0.01
[-0.41, 0.31]
-0.01
[-0.11, -0.05]
-0.01
[-0.07, 0.03]

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

63,450

28,488

29,169

20,556

24,945

Dependent variable is whether the contributors gave again in a subsequent cycle (2004 or 2008). Difference-in-differences estimates of the difference in contribution percentages in 2008 and 2004 for treatment and control groups are shown in boldface. Confidence intervals (90%) are provided
below the estimates. They are generated using a cluster bootstrap with 1,000 replications. These estimates are used to construct Figure 2.
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Table B2. Repeat Contributions Among 2000 Contributors in 14 Treatment States and 9 Control States,
Analyzed Based on the Ideological Distance from the Average Contributor in One’s Zip Code

Intercept
Treatment
Post
Treatment · Post

< -.05

-0.05 to -0.01

0 to 0.49

> 0.5

0.14
[0.9, 0.34]
0.04
[-0.16, 0.2]
-0.03
[-0.06, 0.01]
0.01
[-0.04, 0.05]

0.31
[0.16, 0.62]
-0.03
[-0.34, 0.18]
-0.12
[-0.22, -0.05]
0.04
[-0.05, 0.15]

0.15
[0.08, 0.32]
0.02
[-0.16, 0.18]
-0.03
[-0.05, 0.02]
-0.03
[-0.07, 0]

0.31
[0.14, 0.45]
0.01
[-0.18, 0.19]
-0.01
[-0.12, -0.06]
-0.01
[-0.06, 0.02]

yes

yes

yes

yes

31,546

26,441

40,043

31,541

State fixed effects
Median N. Obs.

A positive ideological distance means the contributor is to the right of the average contributor in the zip code. A negative distance means the contributor is to the left of the average contributor in the zip code. Dependent variable is whether the contributors gave again in a subsequent cycle
(2004 or 2008). Difference-in-differences estimates of the difference in contribution percentages in 2008 and 2004 for treatment and control groups
are shown in boldface. Confidence intervals (90%) are provided below the estimates. They are generated using a cluster bootstrap with 1,000 replications. These estimates are used to construct Figure 3.

Table B3. Repeat Contributions Among 2000 Contributors in 14 Treatment States and 9 Control
States, Analyzed Based on the Measure of Raw Ideology, or Conservatism Score

Intercept
Treatment
Post
Treatment · Post

State fixed effects
Median N. Obs.

< -1

-1 to -0.5

-0.49 to -0.01

0 to 0.49

0.5 to 0.99

1 and above

0.16
[0.01, 0.33]
0.08
[-0.14, 0.27]
-0.05
[-0.09, 0.04]
-0.01
[-0.1, 0.05]

0.18
[0.12, 0.38]
0.06
[-0.17, 0.23]
-0.03
[-0.06, 0]
-0.02
[-0.06, 0.03]

0.16
[0.09, 0.39]
0
[-0.26, 0.21]
-0.08
[-0.12, 0]
0.04
[-0.05, 0.09]

0.28
[0.18, 0.41]
0
[-0.19, 0.23]
-0.13
[-0.23, -0.01]
0.02
[-0.1, 0.12]

0.25
[0.13, 0.55]
-0.01
[-0.33, 0.16]
-0.06
[-0.1, -0.01]
-0.01
[-0.07, 0.03]

0.17
[0.04, 0.37]
-0.05
[-0.24, 0.15]
-0.05
[-0.08, -0.03]
0.02
[-0.01, 0.04]

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

11,122

23,454

23,023

16,355

40,093

14,129

Dependent variable is whether the contributors gave again in a subsequent cycle (2004 or 2008). Difference-in-differences estimates of the difference in contribution percentages in 2008 and 2004 for treatment and control groups are shown in boldface. Confidence intervals (90%) are provided
below the estimates. They are generated using a cluster bootstrap with 1,000 replications. These estimates are used to construct Figure 4.

APPENDIX C: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
C.1. Results using a two-point change threshold
To test our identification assumption that a disclosure score improvement of three points or higher
constituted ‘‘treatment,’’ we relaxed the assumption
to a two-point change constituting treatment. This increased the size of the treatment group by five states
(Hawaii, Montana, New Hampshire, Texas, Wisconsin) and 40,024 contributors. We present the main results using this new treatment group in Table C1. The
point estimate that results is 0, with a maximum negative effect of -0.03. If anything, using a two-point
threshold would strengthen our argument that disclosure has negligible effects here. In the interest of social

scientific integrity (to avoid data mining), we stick
with the three-point threshold from our initial research
design.

C.2. Placebo test with federal data
In this section, we present a placebo test with federal contribution data. Figures C1, C2, and C3 echo
the tables and figures in the main text; the only difference is that the data we used was federal contributions
to candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives
from a given state.
Because there were no changes in federal disclosure
laws over the 2004–2008 time period (and because,
even if there were changes, they would affect contributors from all states equally), we should not observe
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Table C1. Average Effects of Increased Disclosure
Among 215,668 Contributors in 19 Treatment States
and 9 Control States, Where the Threshold
of Determining Whether a State Is in the
Treatment Group Is Relaxed to a Two-Point
Improvement in Disclosure Scores
Model 1
Intercept
Treatment
Post
Treatment · Post
Fixed effects

0.18
[0.15, 0.35]
0.02
[-0.14, 0.13]
-0.07
[-0.08, -0.05]
0.0005
[-0.03, 0.02]
yes

All members of the sample contributed in the year 2000. Dependent
variable is whether the contributors gave again in a subsequent cycle
(2004 or 2008). Difference-in-differences estimates of the difference
in contribution percentages in 2008 and 2004 for treatment and control
groups is shown in boldface. Confidence intervals (90%) are provided
below the estimates. They are generated with clustered bootstrapping
(1,000 replications).

any differences between treatment and control states.
Estimates should be close to zero. If estimates with
the federal data are less negative (more positive)
than estimates with the state data in the main text,
then the triple difference would imply that whatever
trend was happening at the federal level, the more pronounced difference between treatment and control
states at the state level would indicate that there
could actually be treatment effect of enhanced disclosure among those contributing to state races. But what
we see, almost across the board, is that estimates are
more negative at the federal level. Moreover, for the
most part, the lower bound on the 90% confidence intervals is lower for the estimates of federal data than
state data.
These results help support our argument that the effect at the state level is negligible: estimates on the
state contributor data are the same as, or closer to
zero than, the effects we observe where there was no
treatment at all, among federal contributors.

FIG. C1. Repeat contributions in a given federal election cycle by amount contributed in 2000 to federal elections, calculated
with 1,000 bootstrapped difference-in-differences regressions. The repeating percentage decreases in control states (solid black
line) and decreases slightly more in treatment states (dashed, medium gray line) in the wake of enhanced visibility. Same division
of amounts as in main text, though at the federal level, disclosure only occurs for amounts $250 and over.

FIG. C2. Repeat federal contributions to same-state candidates by 2000 contributors in the years 2004 and 2008, grouped by each
contributor’s ideological distance from others in their zip codes. Within-panel difference-in-differences estimates with 90% confidence intervals reported.
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FIG. C3. Repeat federal contributions to same-state candidates by 2000 contributors in the years 2004 and 2008, grouped by
ideological ranges (without taking ideological distance into account). Within-panel difference-in-differences estimates with
90% confidence intervals reported. Confidence intervals are generated using clustered bootstraps (1,000 replications).
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Treatment 2004, 2005, 2008

Treatment 2004, 2007, 2008

Iowa

Kansas

2007, 2008

2005, 2008

Treatment

Treatment

Arizona

2005, 2008

Web nav. added

Colorado

Treatment

Group

Arkansas

State

2003

2003

2003

2007

Name

£ 2008

2008

2007

2003

2008

Geography Employer Amount

Contributions searchable by donor’s .

2008

Download
data

2008(v)

2003(v)
law passed

2003(v)
2007(m)

£2003

2008(v)

Electr.
filing

2005 paper
copies

Data
price Y

Y report
threshold

Table D1. Website and Data Availability Data from the Campaign Disclosure Project

The following multipage table, Table D1, shows legal changes in treatment states over the time period.

APPENDIX D: LEGAL CHANGES IN TREATMENT STATES

(continued)

A.C.A. 7-6-201 (amended 2009,
2011, 2013); A.C.A. 7-6-203
(amended 2009, 2011, 2013);
A.C.A. 7-6-204 - 06; A.C.A.
7-6-207 (amended 2009, 2011,
2013); A.C.A. 7-6-214;
A.C.A. 7-6-218 (amended
2013); A.C.A. 7-6-220
(amended 2011)
A.R.S. 16-901; A.R.S. 16-902.01
(amended 2008, 2010, 2012);
A.R.S. 16-904; A.R.S. 16912–15; A.R.S. 16-916
(amended 2008, 2010, 2012);
A.R.S. 16-918 (amended 2008,
2010); A.R.S. 16-943; A.R.S.
16-958 (amended 2012)
C.R.S.A 1-45-108; C.R.S.A. 145-109 (amended 2009, 2010);
C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 28, 2, 5,
7, 9, 10
I.C.A. 68A.102 (amended 2008,
2010); I.C.A. 68A.201
(amended 2010); I.C.A.
68A.203; I.C.A. 68A.401;
I.C.A. 68A.402 (amended
2008, 2010); I.C.A. 68A.404
(amended 2008, 2009, 2010);
I.C.A. 68A.405; I.C.A.
68A.501; I.C.A. 68B.32A
(amended 2008, 2010)
K.S.A. 25-4143–45; K.S.A. 254147–48 (amended 2008,
2009, 2011); K.S.A. 25-4150;
K.S.A. 25-4153–54; K.S.A.
25-4156–57; K.S.A. 25-4167–
68; K.S.A. 25-4173

Current statutes
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Name

Treatment

Oregon

2004, 2005

Treatment 2004, 2005, 2007

Oklahoma

2004, 2005

2008

2003

2008

2008

2005

2008

2008

£ 2007

2005

2007

2007

2008

2007

Treatment

2007

2008

New York

2007

2003

2005

2007

2007

Download
data

Treatment 2005, 2007, 2008

2007

Geography Employer Amount

New Jersey

2005, 2007 £ 2008

Web nav. added

2004

Treatment

Group

North Carolina Treatment 2004, 2005, 2008

Minnesota

State

Contributions searchable by donor’s .
Electr.
filing

2003(m)
$50k+
2007(m)
$2k+

2003(v)
2006(m)
$20k+

2003(v) legis.
2003(m) state
$5,000+
2003(v)
2007(m)
$100k+
2003(m)
$1k+
2004(m)
all

2003(v)

Table D1. (Continued)
Data
price Y

M.S.A. 10A.01 (amended 2008,
2010, 2013, 2014); M.S.A.
10A.02; M.S.A. 10A.20
(amended 2010, 2013, 2014);
M.S.A. 10A.14 (amended
2008, 2010, 2013)
N.C.G.S.A. 163-278

Current statutes

(continued)

2004 from
N.J.S.A. 19:44A-11; N.J.S.A.
$400 to $300
19:44A-16; N.J.S.A. 19:44A20; N.J.S.A. 19:44A-22.3
NY ELEC 14-118; NY ELEC
14-112; NY ELEC 14-108;
NY ELEC 14-102; NY ELEC
14-100; NY ELEC 14-104;
NY ELEC 14-110; NY ELEC
14-128; NY ELEC 14-120;
NY ELEC 14-106; NY ELEC
14-104
74 Okl. St. Ann. 4256; 74 Okl. St.
Ann. 4255; OK ST Ethics
Commission 257:10-1-13;
Okl. Const. Art. 29, 3; OK ST
Ethics Commission 257:10-112; OK
ST Ethics Commission 257:1-12; OK ST Ethics Commission
257:10-1-11; OK ST Ethics
Commission 257:10-1-19;
OK ST
Ethics Commission 257:10-1-18;
OK ST Ethics Commission
257:10-1-15
O.R.S. 260.055; O.R.S. 260.039;
O.R.S. 260.057; O.R.S.
260.005; O.R.S. 260.083;
O.R.S. 260.112; O.R.S.
260.043; O.R.S. 260.046;
O.R.S. 260.083

2006 from
$100 to $50

Y report
threshold
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Control

Control

Maryland

Mississippi

Yes (fields
not specified)

Treatment

West Virginia

2008

2008

Treatment

Name

Virginia

Web nav. added
2006

Group

South Carolina Treatment

State

2008

2005

2008

2008

Geography Employer Amount

Contributions searchable by donor’s .

2004

Download
data
2006

Electr.
filing

NA

2003(m)
$5k+

2004(v)
2007(m) state

2003(m) state
2003(v) legis

Table D1. (Continued)
Data
price Y

Y report
threshold

(continued)

SC ST 8-13-1302; SC ST 8-131306; SC ST 8-13-1308; SC
ST 8-13-1310; SC ST 8-131304; SC ST 8-13-1368; SC
ST 8-13-1360; SC ST 8-131324; SC ST 8-13-1300
VA Code Ann. 24.2-945.2; VA
Code Ann. 24.2-956; VA Code
Ann. 24.2-957.1; VA Code
Ann. 24.2-958.1; VA Code
Ann. 24.2-959; VA Code Ann.
24.2-943; VA Code Ann. 24.2945.1; VA Code Ann. 24.2947.1; VA Code Ann. 24.2948.4
W. Va. Code 3-1B-2; W. Va.
Code 3-8-5; WV ST 3-8-2; W.
Va. Code 3-8-1a
MD Code, Election Law, 1-101;
MD Code, Election Law, 13208; MD Code, Election Law,
13-305; MD Code, Election
Law, 13-309; MD Code,
Election Law, 13-311; MD
Code, Election Law, 13-316;
MD Code, Election Law, 13304; MD Code, Election Law,
13-207; MD Code, Election
Law, 13-312; MD Code,
Election Law, 13-222; MD
Code, Election Law, 13-221
Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-801;
Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-807;
Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-809;
Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-803;
Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-805;
Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-817;
Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-813;
Miss. Code Ann. 23-15-811

Current statutes

328

Control

South Dakota

Control

New Mexico

Control

Control

Nebraska

Nevada

Control

Group

North Dakota

State

2005, 2008

2007

Web nav. added

2008

2005

2004

Name
2004

Geography Employer Amount

Contributions searchable by donor’s .

2004

Download
data

NA

NA

Electr.
filing

(v)

NA

2003(v)
2006(m)

Table D1. (Continued)

2005 copies
from $1
to 50¢

2004 copies
to 10¢

Data
price Y

Y report
threshold

(continued)

NDCC, 16.1-08.1-02; NDCC,
16.1-08.1-04; NDCC, 16.108.1-01; NDCC, 16.1-08.103.3; NDCC, 16.1-08.1-06;
NDCC, 16.1-08.1-05; NDCC,
16.1-08.1-07
Neb. Rev. St. 49-1410; Neb. Rev.
St. 49-1445; Neb. Rev. St. 491449; Neb. Rev. St. 49-1454;
Neb. Rev. St. 49-1453; Neb.
Rev. St. 49-1470; Neb. Rev. St.
49-1450; Neb. Rev. St. 491462; Neb. Rev. St. 49-1459;
Neb. Rev. St. 49-1456; Neb.
Rev. St. 49-1478.01; Neb. Rev.
St. 49-1472
N.M.S.A. 1978, 1-19-26;
N.M.S.A. 1978, 1-19-33;
N.M.S.A. 1978, 1-19-26.1;
N.M.S.A. 1978, 1-19-29;
N.M.S.A. 1978, 1-19-27;
N.M.S.A. 1978, 1-19-31
N.R.S. 294A.120 (amended
2011, 2013); N.R.S.
294A.380; N.R.S. 294A.400
(amended 2011, 2013); N.R.S.
294A.420 (amended 2011,
2013); N.R.S. 294A.341;
N.R.S. 294A.190
SDCL 12-27-24; SDCL 12-2711; SDCL 12-27-1; SDCL 1227-3 (amended 2010, 2012);
SDCL 12-27-22 (amended
2008, 2010); SDCL 12-27-25
(amended 2008); SDCL 1227-29; SDCL 12-27-6; SDCL
12-27-28 (amended 2008);
SDCL 12-27-16 (amended
2010); SDCL 12-27-15; SDCL
12-27-32; SDCL 12-27-42
(amended 2008)

Current statutes
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Control

Group

2007

2005, 2008

Web nav. added

Name

Geography Employer Amount

Download
data

NA

NA

Electr.
filing

Data
price Y

Y report
threshold

All repealed: 17 V.S.A. 2801–03;
17 V.S.A. 2805–06; 17 V.S.A.
2810 –11; 17 V.S.A. 2882–83;
17 V.S.A. 2892–93
W.S.1977 22-25-101; W.S.1977
22-25-102 (amended 2009,
2011, 2015); W.S.1977 22-25106 (amended 2011);
W.S.1977 22-25-107
(amended 2008, 2013);
W.S.1977 22-25-108
(amended 2015); W.S.1977
22-25-110 (amended 2011);
W.S.1977 22-25-112

Current statutes

Legal citations from Westlaw. Years given are the years that the Project reports improvements made. Many columns are self-explanatory, but not all. ‘‘Web nav. added’’ is the years in which the Campaign Disclosure
Project mentioned that the website had enhanced navigability. Contributions searchable by ‘‘geography’’ are searchable by zip code or address. The year that data is first made downloadable on the website is in the
’’Download data’’ column. For ‘‘Electr. filing,’’ (m) indicates mandatory electronic filing; (v) indicates voluntary electronic filing. Some states only included data filed electronically in searchable databases. Others
included scanned, handwritten filings as ‘‘electronic’’ filings, which greatly reduces searchability. ‘‘Data price Y’’ captures the year in which the price of data (usually on paper or via CD) is reduced. ‘‘Y report
threshold’’ describes the year and amount of any reduction in the threshold for reporting a contribution.

Wyoming

Vermont

State

Contributions searchable by donor’s .

Table D1. (Continued)

